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On The Investigating Violations
Of The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Karen T. Cascini, Sacred Heart University, USA
Alan DelFavero, Graduate Research Assistant, Sacred Heart University, USA

ABSTRACT
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, a plethora of corporate scandals occurred. Due to these
corporate debacles, corporate executives have been placed under fire. In response to such
unethical conduct with regard to internal practices and financial reporting, legislation has been
passed in order to ensure that corporations conduct their business in an ethical manner. The
purpose of this paper is to assess the connection between the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 (FCPA) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOx), to determine whether SOx has
influenced the FCPA’s investigative violation activities by examining the number of such
investigations since the passage SOx. This paper also addresses specific cases of violations of
anti-corruption laws and compares SOx and the FCPA on violation penalties.
Keywords: accounting, bribery, corporate scandals, business ethics, business law, Sarbanes Oxley Act, Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, fraud, bribery, corruption, ethics, Dept. of Justice

INTRODUCTION

O

n July 30, 2002, President Bush signed SOx into law, which created the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) to “oversee the financial reporting of public companies.” The act was
sponsored by Maryland Democratic Senator Paul Sarbanes and Ohio Republican Senator, Michael
Oxley, and was created in order to improve accounting credibility and reduce corporate fraud (Grumet, 2007).
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), however, was originally created in an effort to punish
U.S. companies and citizens who bribed “foreign government officials, politicians, or political parties, either in the
form of money or anything of value, to obtain and/or maintain business.” The FCPA is principally enforced by the
Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission (Norris, 2006). The FCPA‟s anti-bribery
provisions apply to „issuers‟, „domestic concerns,‟ and „any person‟ that violates the Act while in the territory of the
United States. “An issuer is a corporation that has issued a security that has been registered in the United States or
who is required to file periodic reports with the SEC.” However, under the amendment to the law in 1998, a foreign
corporation would be subject to FCPA regulations if they attempted to bribe a U.S. company as well (U.S.
Department of Justice).
Yet, the FCPA is relatively broad and indistinct. Under the Act‟s regulations, it is illegal for U.S. citizens,
companies, and employees of U.S. companies to “bribe foreign politicians or government officials to secure any
improper business advantage. But that‟s not all; „the law applies to all U.S. persons, which can include any noncitizen who does business with an American company,‟ according to John W. Brooks, senior international counsel at
Luce Forward Hamilton & Scripps in San Diego” (Wellner, 2006).
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Since the FCPA is a much older act than SOx, it is important to determine if its passage has strengthened
the FCPA in the area of increases in violation investigations (A timeline of events is listed in Exhibit1 on the next
page).

Year
1972
1973-74
1977
1988
1998
2001-02
2002
2002-07

Exhibit 1 Timeline
Lockheed Martin Bribery Scandal in China
President Nixon Watergate Scandal & Resignation
FCPA Enacted By Congress
FCPA Amendment - Employees can now be held accountable for their actions prior to the organization being charged
FCPA Amendment- International Bribery Act Created in order to hold foreign corporations accountable when dealing
with U.S. firms
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco Scandals Revealed
Enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 by Paul Sarbanes & Michael Oxley
Investigations of FCPA violations increase 125%

A COMPARISON OF FCPA AND SOx
An important question to ask here is, “Why was the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enacted by congress in
the first place?” Amidst the Watergate scandal during the Nixon Administration in the mid-1970‟s, the general
public became much more aware of the corruption potential of government officials and corporations. In September
of 1972, Lockheed Corporation had given at least $2 million of donations to Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei
Tanaka. As a result, in 1974, Tanaka was forced to resign after the outbreak of a large scandal, which eventually
led to his 1983 conviction on corruption charges. Although Lockheed was a large factor behind the creation of the
FCPA, during the 1970‟s, based on a SEC investigation, 450 other American corporations were found to have
induced foreign companies to accept bribes as well. In addition, at this time, the country was faced with former
President Nixon‟s scandal and resignation. Accordingly, during the Carter Administration, Congress created the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 (Graham & Lam, 2007, p.61). Yet, the Act was amended in 1988
during President Ronald Reagan‟s rein, and again in 1998 in the midst of the Clinton era.
Even though the FCPA was created to prevent corruption, numerous organizations, at first, were “fearful
that the act would place them at a competitive disadvantage with foreign competitors” (Snow, 2006). Consequently,
businesses argued that payoffs were necessary to conduct business globally, since many countries bribed in order to
conduct business. (Graham & Lam, 2007, p.62). Prior to the increase of corporate scandals, the FCPA was not
enforced to the same degree as it has been in the post-Enron era. Between 2002 and 2006, law enforcement activity
has increased markedly as opposed to the previous decades. “Sarbanes-Oxley and foreign treaties have made it
much easier for U.S. prosecutors to extract information from abroad” (Freedman, 2006). SOx allowed for the SEC
and DOJ to “sniff out the „offshore intermediaries‟ that helped corporations seeking to sidestep provisions of the
FCPA, prohibiting payoffs to foreign officials” (Schrage, 2005, p. A21).
For instance, between 2001 and 2006, the average number of SEC & DOJ proceedings increased to slightly
less than four and five proceedings per year, respectively. Consequently, there has been a 569% increase in the
average number of SEC & DOJ proceedings between the 1995-2000 and the 2001-2006 time periods (Shearman &
Sterling, 2007, p.3).
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The FCPA regulations alone severely penalize companies and individuals for paying bribes to foreign
officials. “The term „foreign official‟ denotes any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity
for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency or instrumentality, or for on behalf of any such
public international organization” (United States of America Fifth Congress, 1998). The penalties for firms,
executives, and individuals are steep. Businesses can be fined up to $2 million. However, executives may appear to
get the brunt of the punishment. Corrupt management can receive up to a $100,000 fine and up to a five year jail
sentence. “Under federal criminal laws other than the FCPA, individuals may be fined up to $250,000 or twice the
amount of the gross gain or gross loss if the defendant derives pecuniary gain from the offense or causes a pecuniary
loss to another person” (Graham & Lam, 2007, p.62). Sections 103 and 104 of the FCPA “prohibit a corporation
from making payments to foreign officials for the purpose of inducing him to obtain or retain business from the
corporation or to influence legislation or regulations of the government. These two sections cover payments and
gifts intended to influence the receipt, regardless of who first suggested the payment of the gift” (U.S. Department of
Justice, 1977).
However, there is a provision written into the FCPA that contains an exception to the anti-bribery laws.
U.S. companies are allowed to make “facilitating payments,‟ made in furtherance of routine governmental action.
The statute lists multiple examples of payments that may be made to facilitate or expedite performance of routine
governmental action, including payments to: obtain permits, licenses, or other official documents; process
governmental papers, such as visa and work orders; provide police protection; mail pick-up and delivery; provide
phone service, power and water supply, cargo handling, or protection of perishable products; and schedule
inspections associated with contract performance or transit of goods across country,” under Section 78 (U.S.
Department of Justice, 2000).
In regards to the accounting systems within a company, there are regulatory statutes as well. Section 102
“requires reporting companies to make and keep books, records, and accounts which fairly reflect all of their
transactions and dispositions of assets. A reporting company would also be required to establish and maintain an
adequate system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that: transactions are
executed in accordance with management decisions; transactions are recorded in a manner that permits the company
to prepare financial statements in accordance with GAAP or other applicable criteria and to maintain accountability
for its assets; access to company assets is only allowed with management authorizations; and the recorded
accountability for assets is compared with existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with
respect to differences. New Paragraph 3 of Section 102 would make it unlawful for any person knowingly to make
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or cause a materially false or misleading statement or to omit to state or cause another person to omit to state any
material fact. This paragraph would apply to statements made to an accountant in connection with any examination
or audit of an issuer with securities registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as well as any examination or audit
of a reporting company (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977).
Enhancing the credibility of the “corporate books and records and reliability of the audit process” is one of
the main reasons for the creation of Section 102, which aides the issuer in conducting its audit, by helping improve
internal controls. Under Section 102, “there is a prohibition against falsification of accounting records and
deception of auditors.” If the deception is simply negligence, penalties will not apply. On the other hand, if a
person is aware that he/she is indeed making a false statement, thus, creating inaccurate corporate records, there will
be consequences (U.S. Department of Justice, 1977).
Yet, the passage of SOx does not significantly change the corporation‟s internal requirements for
maintaining internal control, stated in the FCPA. “SOx mandate new disclosures about and assessments of internal
controls. Specifically, SOx 302 increases disclosure requirements related to the effectiveness of, and significant
changes in, internal control” (Ge & McVay, 2005).
Under Section 302 of SOx, a CEO and CFO must officially state that they have reviewed their
organization‟s financial statements (quarterly and annual reports filed with the SEC), and to their knowledge, the
data presented fairly represents the true economic condition of the corporation and does not contain any dishonest
statements (Prentice, 2005, p. 25).
In addition, “they must also certify that they are responsible for establishing and maintaining their
company‟s internal financial controls, they have formulated these controls to ensure that the relevant material
information is made known to them, that they have recently evaluated the effectiveness of internal controls, and
have presented in the report their conclusions about the controls‟ effectiveness” (p. 25).
Lastly, the CEO and CFO must report to the auditors all of the known facts. Regardless of materiality, if
there is corruption involving employees and management, severe deficiencies, or faults within internal controls,
CEOs and CFOs must confirm that they have reported this to the auditors or audit committees (p. 25). As a result of
the passing of SOx, executives are now personally liable if they allow any type of fraudulent activity to occur within
their organization. Section 302 raises more awareness within an organization of the potential dangers of corrupt
practices.
In addition, SOx Section 404 supports Section 302. Section 404 “requires management to annually
disclose its assessment of the firm's internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting and include the
corresponding opinions by the firm's auditor” (Ge & McVay, 2005). More particularly, “while the FCPA required
public companies to institute effective internal controls to stop the bribes and make executives accountable, SOx 404
goes further, but has similar goals. This section requires corporations to institute (1) a disclosure committee to
review procedures and processes; (2) a disclosure coordinator (any one person within the organization who can ask
questions and try to keep everyone on track); (3) a timeline and a responsibility chart; (4) sub-certifications where
lower level employees certify the accuracy of the information they send up the line of control within the
organization, (5) codes of conduct for all accounting and financial employees; (6) a great deal of consultation with
internal audit and outside advisors; and (7) established documentation procedures” (Prentice, 2005, p. 36).
These executives are held personally liable for the credibility of the data presented within the financial
reports. If there is fraud detected, then these executives could face prosecution. “By criminalizing false
certifications -- the law inadvertently fostered a new industry of global compliance auditors. In the United States,
these auditors identified fraudulent „special purpose entities‟ that permitted Enron to shift losses off its balance
sheets” (Schrage, 2005, p. A21). Yet, an important question to ask here is, “What is a „special purpose entity‟?” The
term “special purpose entity” (SPE) is typically not included in the average person‟s daily vocabulary. In common
terms, an SPE is a separate entity designed to accomplish a special task for the sponsoring corporation. Many times,
an SPE will provide liquidity for the sponsor through purchasing assets from the sponsor and providing them with
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cash. While these entities can be designed for legitimate purposes, there are cases, such as Enron, where they are
rendered bogus.
In better defined terms, a SPE is “formed by a sponsoring company and is capitalized with an equity
investment, some of which must be from independent third parties.” The SPE supports these investments through
“borrowings from the credit market and purchases of earnings assets for or from the sponsoring company.” Over
time, however, the cash provided from these earning assets will provide gains for the equity investors, along with
paying down the debt accumulated (Halsey, Subramanyam, & Wild, 2004, pgs. 162-163). For example, a company
can utilize SPEs if there is a need to sell accounts receivables. The organization can remove the receivables from
their balance sheet and then receive cash which can be invested in other earning assets. The SPE, through a process
called securitization, “collateralizes bonds that it sells in the credit markets with the receivables and uses the cash to
purchase additional receivables on an ongoing basis as the company‟s credit card portfolio grows (pgs. 162-163).
Since SPEs are generally “off-balance sheet,” (meaning that information is only included in the footnotes)
it is very difficult for the accounting industry to easily evaluate the impact that the SPEs have on the sponsoring
company. Rules, regulations, and procedures for consolidation with the sponsoring company, are covered very little
by GAAP. “Accountants usually do not require consolidation as long as the SPE is capitalized with outside equity
from independent third-parities of at least 10% of total capitalization. This level has been raised from 3%, however,
since Enron” The third party must tolerate the risk of the investment in order for the SPE not to be consolidated into
the sponsor‟s financial statements (p. 164).
In the case of Enron, SPEs were abused and misused. According to the company‟s CFO, Enron would not
have been able to maintain its growth rate, financial leverage, or its debt rating, without the use of the SPEs.
Increased issuance of common stock would have lowered the share price, thus, decreasing shareholder value, and
debt issuances would have raised the corporation‟s debt ratio. Consequently, company earnings were inflated, as a
result of the hidden debt in the SPEs. “Essentially, Enron designed these SPEs and capitalized them with their own
stock, covered by forward contracts to preserve its value from potential decline.” Yet, this SPE does not have any
outside equity of its own from a third party, and its assets consist solely of common stock. Additionally, the SPEs
were not consolidated into Enron‟s balance sheet. (p. 166). Deceptive practices such as these were the primary
driving factor behind the development of SOx, and its stringent self-examination requirements.
The self-examination requirement imposed by SOx is one of the chief reasons behind the strong increase in
FCPA enforcement actions, interacting with “self reporting compelled under the federal prosecutorial guidelines for
corporate criminality” (LaCroix, 2007). “Consequently, corporations are finding their own FCPA violations
internally and turning themselves in” (LaCroix, 2007).

Exhibit 2

Reported Investigations: 2002-06
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Source: Shearman & Sterling LLP © 2007
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According to Shearman & Sterling, as organizations engage in the merger and acquisition process, they are
more apt to confess acts of wrongdoing immediately. While the number of reported investigations to the DOJ and
SEC have risen in the aggregate, the proportion of cases, resulting from voluntary disclosure, have grown
significantly relative to government initiated inquires. “Between 2005 and 2007, 23 of the 26 cases reported to the
SEC or DOJ were voluntarily disclosed” (Sherman & Sterling, 2007, p. 6, 7).
For example, Swiss-based ABB Ltd., a global provider of power technologies, improperly “paid $1.1
billion in bribes to officials in Nigeria, Angola, and Kazakhstan between 1998 and 2003. Additionally, the company
improperly booked payments, and lacked the internal controls to prevent them. In one instance, ABB‟s country
manager for Angola doled out $21,600 in a brown paper bag to five officials of the state-owned oil company.”
Nevertheless, even when companies disclose internal findings of bribery within business deals and mergers and
acquisitions, this does not assure the company that the SEC will not punish them as severely as companies that do
not confess. Although ABB worked with authorities in terms of announcing to the SEC and the Justice Department
that they had discovered bribery violations at its foreign subsidiaries, they were still forced to pay $10.5 million and
an additional $5.9 million in fines (Katz, 2004).
Additional cases of corporations disclosing suspected bribes are UPS and former Germany based DaimlerChrysler. CFO.com, in March 2006, stated that United Parcel Service (UPS) had launched an investigation into its
supply chain subsidiary for potential violations “prior to its 2001 acquisition of a freight forwarding business from
Fritz Companies, Inc.” UPS, however, believes that there were only a few former employees who “directed the
questionable conduct (Taub, 2006).
In addition, former DaimlerChrysler AG revealed that numerous employees were expelled from the
corporation on the grounds that they made „improper payments‟ in foreign jurisdictions including Africa, Asia, and
Eastern Europe (Taub, 2006). However, there is the argument that these extremely stringent rules have been
detrimental to the obtaining of contracts. Even though this argument may be valid, it is much more important for
American businesses to maintain strong ethical standards. While the ethics behind the payment of bribes depends
on cultural values, it is clearly unethical in the United States, and U.S. companies must abide by the FCPA laws.
THE FCPA/SOxs’ CONNECTION & DIRECT EFFECT ON STAKEHOLDERS
In recent years, globalization has had a profound effect on international commerce and financial markets,
and has created an increased tendency for executives to accept bribes in order to gain business overseas. For
instance, businesses face a great challenge when attempting to conduct business in China. Because China is one of
the fastest growing economies currently in the world, U.S. organizations are being enticed to participate in corrupt
activity due to the lucrative profit potential that exists. (Goodman, 2005, p. A1). Until 2004, China was not
recognized by the FCPA for regulation violations. Yet, since then, there have been increasing numbers of
violations. (Norton, 2006). At the current growth rates in the Chinese economy of 8% to 10% per year, China‟s
gross national product “would equal that of the United States‟ by 2015” (Graham & Lam, 2007, p. 43). According to
the Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index in 2005, on a scale of 1-10, where lower scores
suggest higher levels of bribery, China scored a mere 3.2, while Iceland scored the highest at an impressive 9.7. The
U.S. scored 7.6 (p. 68).
“In February 2004, the secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline of the Communist Party of
China (CPC) reported that between December 2002 and November 2003, 174,580 Chinese officials were disciplined
for violating anti-corruption laws or policies.” The Chinese economy has grown significantly primarily due to the
“decentralization of political decision-making and law enforcement, and loosening executive control.” Nevertheless,
Chinese government leaders are more prone to accepting bribes since they are poorly paid. “Government leaders
proclaim that „to get rich is glorious and officials see others enriching themselves” (China Law & Practice, 2004).
As China has become a much more profitable region of the world, companies have begun to concentrate their efforts
on obtaining business there. Consequently, American corporations, executives, and citizens are getting caught in the
corruption cross-fire.
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For American businesses, transactions in China are more difficult to conduct as a result of FCPA
regulations. Yet, as China‟s financial operations become increasingly global, not only Americans, but the Chinese,
are obligated to reduce bribes. For instance, the FCPA applies to 50 of China‟s largest firms such as China
Telecom, Lenovo, and China Life Insurance. Although these companies are not located within the U.S., the FCPA
does have authority over their executives and employees since they are listed as American Depository Receipts on
U.S. exchanges (Graham & Lam, 2007, pgs. 68, 71).
“Between May 1, 2003, and April 30 2004, competition for 47 contracts worth $18 billion „may have been
affected by bribery by foreign firms of foreign officials, according to a July 2004, report issued by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. U.S. firms lost at least eight of the contracts, worth $3 billion” (Katz, 2004).
Nonetheless, while the FCPA may impose strict requirements, thus preventing some companies from being
competitive worldwide, many companies, both domestic and foreign have continued to commit bribery. (A chart
summarizing corporate FCPA corruption scandals is listed in Table I).

TABLE I: FCPA Violations Chart
Company

Year(s)

Crime

ABB, Ltd

1998-2003

$1.1m in bribes to Nigeria, Angola, &
Kazakhstan Officals & $21,600 in brown paper bag
(A)

Daimler
Chrysler
El Paso
Corp
GE-InVision

Halliburton
Lee
Dynamics

1994-2002

SOX
Violations

FCPA
Violations
AB

N/C/PI

B&R
ACP

$16.4m (1)

N/A

N/A

2000-01

Improper Payments to foreign jurisdictions (B)
Payments to Iraqi Officials under UN Oil for Food
Program (C)

N/A
N/C/PI
404

2002-04

Kickbacks to Asian Officials (D)

N/C/PI

1993-98

May Have Bribed Nigerian Officials for Favorable
Tax Treatment (E)

2004-05

Lucent

2000-03

Siemens AG

2000-06

Thousands of Dollars in Bribes to U.S Army Officers
to attain $11m in contracts (F)
Bribery of Chinese officials for access to telecom
market (G)

Penalty

B&P
ACP
AB
B&R
ACP

$1.18m (3)

NYD

NYD

N/A

NYD

NYD

N/A

N/C/PI

B&P
ACP
NYD

$1.5 m (4)
$1m (5)
$790m (6)

€1.3 billion in suspicious transactions to foreign
governments/telecommunications ministers (H)

NYD

$7.7m (2)

SOX Violation Abbreviations
None Charged. However, Organization Lacking Internal Controls = N/C/PI
None Charged. Yet, a Potential Violation of SOX 404 Exists Due to a Lack of Internal Controls= N/C/PI 404
Not Yet Determined= NYD
FCPA Violation Abbreviations
Anti-Bribery Provision (Section 30A of SEC Act of 1934) = AB
Books & Record Provision (Section 13 (b)(2)(A) of SEC Act of 1934) = B&R
Accounting Control Provisions (Section 13 (b)(2)(B) of SEC Act of 1934) = ACP
Not Yet Determined, but at least Section A of SEC Act of 1934, if charged= NYD
Penalty Explanation
(1)
$16.4 Million Paid to the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
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$7.7 Million Paid to DOJ & SEC
$1.18 Million Paid in Civil Penalties
$1.15 Million Paid to the SEC
$1 Million Paid to the U.S. Treasury

Footnotes
A) U.S. SEC, 2004
F) Glanz & Scmitt, 2007
Giii) The FCPA Blog, 2007

B) Lander, 2006
C) Snow, 2006
D) U.S. SEC, 2005
E) Katz, 2004
Gi) NJ Biz, 27
Gii) U.S. Court for the District of Columbia, 2007
(H) Africa News Blog, 2007

In April 2004, former New Jersey based Lucent Technologies, Inc., which has since merged with the
French telecom giant, Alcatel, publicly disclosed that four senior officials in China had been fired on the grounds
that they violated FCPA regulations (Norton, 2006). “Lucent identified the dismissal of the four executives as the
president, chief operating officer, a marketing executive, and a finance manager for its China operations,” based on
the belief that Lucent may have bribed Chinese officials in order to gain access to their markets (Taub, 2006).
Presumably, telecom company executives, such as China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Netcom
(Lucent‟s clients) accepted payments for “approving purchases of equipment worth hundreds of millions of U.S.
dollars from foreign and domestic makers” (Xinhau News Agency, 2004). The corruption was discovered “during
the company‟s FCPA compliance audits which stemmed from an investigation into its practices in Saudi Arabia.”
(Taub, 2004).
In relation to Saudi Arabia, in July 1998, the company won a $699 million mobile telephone. According to
the National Group, Lucent paid $15 million in bribes to a Saudi Minister, Ali-al-Johani, in exchange for receiving
good treatment from the nation‟s telephone agency and ultimately, winning the contract (U.S. Investigates Lucent,
New York Times, 2003). Though Lucent claimed that these assertions were untrue, National Group argued that the
company engaged in several acts of corruption. Not only were bribes offered to Ali-al-Johani, who turned out to be
the “chairman of the government controlled Saudi Telecom Company,” but this bribe was intended to force Saudi
Telecom to act against National Group and act in the best interests of Lucent (Technology Briefing:
Telecommunications: Saudi Company Sues Lucent, New York Times, 2003).
SEC examination into the potential bribery in China and Saudi Arabia was still in progress, as of May 2006
(Lucent Technologies Form 10Q, 2006). Consequently, in reaction to the unethical behavior in Saudi Arabia, Lucent
investigated operations in 23 other nations, including Brazil, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Russia. In turn,
Lucent strengthened their internal controls and policies to prevent additional FCPA violations worldwide. In
addition to firing the four executives in China, Lucent mandated that, until a new president was appointed, the
Chinese division would report to the president of global sales. Although Lucent was not confident on how this
would affect Chinese operations, the company believed that the impact would be immaterial on earnings in the
aggregate (Taub, 2004).
In addition, General Electric (GE) was not immune to corruption scandals either. In 2004, GE announced
that its acquiree, InVision Technologies, had been charged “for paying kickbacks to government officials in several
Asian countries, including China, prior to GE‟s acquisition” (Norton, 2006). Chiefly, InVision produced and sold
airport bomb-detection machines which scanned airline passengers‟ belongings. (Stoller, 2004). The company,
based in Newark, California, between June 2002 and June 2004, “had retained distributors and sales agents in China,
the Philippines, and Thailand to sell bomb-detection equipment to local airports.” (Wellner, 2006).
Nevertheless, according to the SEC and DOJ, however, InVision never attempted to prevent the sales
agents or distributors from bribing governments overseas even though they were fairly certain that these agents and
distributors would attempt to sweeten any offer with gifts in order to gain business for InVision. (U.S. S.E.C., 2005).
While InVision did not admit or deny guilt, they settled and paid more than $1 million in penalties to the U.S.
government, “while agreeing to pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest, cease and desist from violations of the
FCPA, and comply with its undertakings to retain an independent consultant to ensure that the company adheres to a
28
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corporate compliance program to detect and prevent violations of the FCPA” (U.S. S.E.C., 2005). Consequently,
GE‟s Security of Homeland Protection, “performs intense background checks on all third-party relationships,
according to Timothy Baxter, general counsel of GE‟s Security‟s Homeland Protection” (Wellner, 2006). While the
practice may be relatively intrusive, it needs to be conducted if the company wants to avoid being liable under
FCPA regulations.
However, corrupt activity was not limited to InVision. In another example, in 2004, Halliburton, disclosed
to the SEC and DOJ that it “may have bribed Nigerian officials to secure favorable tax treatment for a liquefiednatural-gas facility” (Katz, 2004). In 1996, a consortium that Halliburton later acquired was awarded an $8.1 billion
contract for the rights to build a natural gas plant. However, it was revealed by Halliburton‟s lawyers that, between
1993 and 1998, a time when human maltreatment was occurring under military dictator Sani Abacha‟s rule of
Nigeria, “the consortium had written notes back and forth between Nigerian officials” (Gold, 2004, p. A3). The
ethical implication of this merger is even more significant since it involved Vice President Dick Cheney. At the
time, Cheney was the corporation‟s CEO. However, according to Halliburton officials, Cheney was never cognizant
of the corruption. Presently, the company has begun to take measures to prevent this criminal and immoral behavior
from reoccurring (p. A3).
Subsequently, a case involving thousands of dollars worth of bribes, concerned Lee Dynamics
International. Although Lee Dynamics is based in the U.S., it had operated from Kuwait. As of July 2007, under
the authority of the U.S. Army, all business dealings with the government were stopped due to the fact that Lee
Dynamics allegedly paid an undisclosed number of bribes worth hundreds of thousands of dollars to Army officers
“to build, operate, and maintain warehouses in Iraq that stored weapons, uniforms, vehicles, and other materials for
Iraqi forces in 2004 and 2005” (Glanz & Scmitt, 2007, p. A1). “In 2004, the company was awarded an $11.7 million
contract to build, operate, and maintain the Iraqi warehouses,” along with an additional $12 million contract in 2005
(p. A1).
On an individual basis, after accepting at least $225,000 in bribes from Lee Dynamics, Major Gloria D
Davis, a contracting official in Kuwait committed suicide in Baghdad in December 2006. The investigation
uncovered acceptances of $9.6 million in bribes for defense contracts in Iraq and Kuwait to Major John Cockerham,
a former Army contracting officer in Kuwait, and his wife and sister (p. A1). Overall, Lee Dynamics has taken
advantage of the millions of dollars of contracts made available since the fall of the Iraqi government. Additionally,
these military officials exploited the opportunity to profit from accepting illegal kickbacks.
More recently, a bribery case of mammoth proportions involved German electronics and engineering giant
Siemens AG. According to a Munich, Germany court ruling on October 4, 2007, in order to obtain very profitable
contracts for telecommunications equipment, “Siemens paid four former undisclosed Nigerian telecommunications
ministers a total of 77 bribes equivalent to €12 million or $17.5 million” (Crawford & Esterl, 2007, p. A1).
At the end of 2006, the investigation of Siemens commenced with a search of company headquarters by the
German police. Consequently, Mr. Reinhard Siekaczek, a thirty-eight year telecommunications equipment unit
manager at Siemens, was charged by the German court for embezzlement. Reinhard, fully cooperative with the
prosecution, claimed that he was aware of additional bribes in other countries beyond the three countries in question.
For example, Siekaczek told Munich prosecutors that foreign managers committed bribes in “more than a dozen
countries including Brazil, Cameroon, Egypt, Greece, Poland, and Spain, according to a separate court records
reviewed by the Wall Street Journal.” Lastly, the company announced that its Chinese operations were also being
investigated on the grounds that there was “corruption at several business units, including those specializing in
medical equipment, factory automation, and information technology (Africa News Blog, 2007).
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Yet, this inquiry rapidly grew into one of Europe‟s largest bribery ever. “A Munich court ruling listed
bribes from €2,000 to €2.25 million steered by Siekaczek and colleagues to dozens of government officials in these
three countries, with about €10 million paid to Nigerians, including an immigration official, a senator, and four
former telecommunications minister.” Consequently, in November 2007, Siemens admitted that it had identified
€1.3 billion in “suspicious transactions world-wide between 2000 and 2006” (Africa News Blog, 2007).
Although Siemens is located in Germany, the U.S. government does have jurisdiction over the
multinational since the company is listed as an ADR on the New York Stock Exchange and has wide-ranging
operations in the U.S. While the Munich courts penalized Siemens for $290 million, payable in Germany, there is
no doubt that the consequences for this immoral action will be even more severe in the U.S. “Washington wants to
hold foreign companies to the same standards as their U.S. competitors” (Ewing & Javers, 2007, p. 78).
Accordingly, in compliance with the U.S., Siemens has invested in excess of $500 million to investigate its internal
practices through the use of “installing a team of monitors which will report directly to U.S. authorities, to make
sure that the company banishes palm-greasing permanently” (p. 78).

Fines in $U.S. millions

Exhibit 3

$20.0

FCPA Violation Penalties
$16.4m

$15.0
$7.7m

$10.0

$2.5m

$5.0

$1.2m

$0.0
ABB, Ltd

El Paso Corp

GE-InVision

Lee Dynamics

Corporations Found Guilty of FCPA Violations

A similar FCPA violation scandal involved El Paso Corp. “On February 7, 2007 the Department of Justice
and the SEC said El Paso Corp. agreed to pay $7.7 million to settle charges that it and a company it acquired,
Coastal Corp., paid kickbacks to Iraqi officials under U.S. wire fraud, under the United Nations' Oil for Food
program in 2000 and 2001” (Snow, 2006).
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In addition, in October and November 2007, York International, Ingersoll-Rand, and Chevron were
involved in making illegal payments to the former Iraqi government under the U.N. Oil for Food Program, as well
during 2001 and 2002. Monies paid by Chevron were not only kept secret, but they were considered to be illegal
under U.S. wire-fraud statutes. York International, Ingersoll-Rand, and Chevron were charged and forced to pay
$22 million, $6.7 million, and $30 million, respectively, in fines to the U.S. government agencies (Taub, 2007).
While it is generally considered noble for these corporations to turn themselves in for their corrupt internal
findings, the costs are still rather significant. When the government determines that these companies have violated
FCPA law, “they are opening themselves up to years of negative publicity, fines, criminal investigations,
indictments and highly intrusive compliance monitors that have billed companies for as many as 40,000 hours, at
rates up to $700 an hour” (Freedman, 2006). Ultimately, this amounts to $28,000,000! Although all of these new
rules and regulations have placed some of these U.S. corporations at a disadvantage, isn‟t it true that, with the
passage, of SOx and the FCPA, that corruption is finally being tackled at a serious rate?
Finally, while businesses have been the primary focus of this paper, as previously noted, the FCPA applies
to American citizens as well. As an example, former Louisiana Democratic Representative William J. Jefferson
faced a 16-count indictment on the grounds that he accepted hundreds of thousands of dollars in a Nigerian business
deal. During 2005, the FBI brought to Jefferson‟s attention that they possessed evidence, in the form of a video,
proving that he accepted “$100,000 from a Nigerian government informant, according to a prosecution document
filed September 28, 2007, in federal court in Alexandria, VA” (Lengel, 2007, p. A3).
Allegedly, Jefferson, the “the former co-chairman of the congressional caucus on Nigeria and African
trade” not only collected money for himself and his family, but his main goal was to bribe a Nigerian Vice President
to support U.S. financing for a sugar factory within Nigeria, in so that the sugar factory owners could pay Jefferson
and his family commissions. Even worse, Jefferson reported these trips to Nigeria as “official business.” After
conducting a house search, the FBI discovered $90,000 worth of bills in Jefferson‟s freezer, allegedly accepted from
“a Virginian businesswoman who was working as an informant, to bribe a Nigerian official in a business deal” (p.
A3).
Regardless of the amount of money, this government official, who clearly had a better understanding of the
FCPA than the average individual, involved himself in crooked activity. An elected official who abuses the FCPA
in order to collect and use funds for personal gain must be held accountable for such illegal and unethical acts.
OTHER CORPORATE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
Additionally, there is corporate criminal activity that does not fall within the parameters of the FCPA or
SOx. An example of such activity is Blackwater USA. Blackwater is an American security company based in North
Carolina who contracted with the U.S. Department of State to protect non-military personnel in Iraq war zones.
There were approximately 987 guards stationed in Iraq, earning an average of $1,222 per day. However, many of
these agents did not protect the non-military personnel. For instance, a “drunken Blackwater employee murdered an
Iraqi civilian in cold blood. A congressional report found that out of 195 fatal accidents in Iraq, Blackwater was
responsible for 163 of them,” or 84%. In addition, the military reported that seventeen innocent civilians were
murdered without any real cause by Blackwater personnel (Stevenson, 2007).
In addition, Blackwater, according to Democratic California Representative Harry Waxman, “evaded $31
million in taxes by labeling their employees as „independent contractors” (Stevenson, 2007). This has allowed the
company to avoid paying Social Security and Medicare taxes, as well as federal income and unemployment taxes
from May 2006 to March 2007. The Internal Revenue Service ruled that the labeling of employees as independent
contractors was „without merit‟ (Kirchgaessner, 2007). In response to the killings, the Iraqi government forced
Blackwater to make a swift departure from the nation (Stevenson, 2007).
However, in front of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, U.S. Department Secretary
Condoleezza Rice revealed that “there was a „hole‟ in United States Law that had allowed Blackwater USA
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employees and other armed contractors in Iraq to escape legal jeopardy for crimes possibly committed there”
(Broder, 2007, p. A6).
Although Rice was cognizant of the fact that the administration needed to back new government laws and
regulations in order to determine how contractors conducting business overseas would be handled in situations such
as these, she expressed some concerns in regards to trying “contractors under the military justice system” (p. A6).
While Blackwater USA‟s crimes do not fall under the provisions of the FCPA or SOx, criminal activity
does exist. Although the tax evasion has occurred on a domestic level, Blackwater USA employees did “perform”
their job duties within Iraq, a foreign country. However, these “job duties” were mostly proven to be of a criminal
nature.
CONCLUSION
According to the World Bank, “corruption is the single largest obstacle to economic growth in poor
countries” (Schrage, 2005, p. A21). These executives and individuals know the consequences for paying a foreign
official a bribe. The facts presented above are clear. The passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, and more
specifically sections 302 and 402, requiring the CEO and CFO to validate that the information is fairly presented
within their financial statements, has significantly increased the number of investigated violations under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. Since 2002, there have been more violations discovered than in all of the 1980‟s and
1990‟s combined. This is a clear indicator that SOx has enhanced the FCPA in this regard. It would be prudent of
U.S. corporations, businesses, and individuals to abide by anti-corruption laws. Legislation is heading in the correct
direction, however, more needs to be done in the future in order to significantly reduce corruption.
The authors believe that the FCPA should be extended to encompass more stringent anti-corruption
regulations. Dr. Rice admits that U.S. law is lacking in bringing criminal charges against Blackwater. While this
company may not have committed any bribes, they were most definitely involved in criminal activity. An
appropriate amendment to the FCPA could deter criminal activity such as in this case.
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